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THE REVENUE ACT OF 1964:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
CHARLES L. B. LOWNDES*
N its inception the Revenue Act of 19641 was intended to achieve
the dual objectives of reducing the rates of the income tax and
closing some of its more egregious loopholes. After the Kennedy ad-
ministration professed its willingness to accept tax reduction with-
out tax reform, any serious effort to improve the structure of the
law was abandoned. The result is that the new act accomplishes
some rate reduction, but does little in the way of tax reform.
RATES
The most significant achievement of the 1964 Act is rate reduc-
tion. This is scheduled to take place in two stages during 1964 and
1965, with approximately two-thirds of the total reduction taking
effect in 1964.
The income tax rates for individuals are reduced for 1964 from
a top bracket of 91 percent and a bottom bracket of 20 percent to a
top bracket of 77 percent and a bottom bracket of 16 percent. In
1965 the maximum bracket becomes 70 percent and the minimum
14 percent.2 Actually, individual tax savings are less substantial
than they seem in view of the proposed increases in the social
security tax. For example, a married taxpayer with an income of
*A.B. 1923, Georgetown University; LL.B. 1926, S.J.D. 1931, Harvard University.
James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University. Author [with Robert Kramer],
FEDERAL ESrATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1956).
L 78 Stat. 19 (1964).
2 Under prior law the minimum tax of 20% was applicable to the first $2,000 of
taxable income. Under the 1964 Act, the corresponding 1964 tax is 16% for the first
$500 of taxable income, 16.5% for the next $500, 17.5% for the next $500, and 18%
for the final $500. In 1965 the rates will be 14%, 15%, 16% and 17% for corresponding
brackets of taxable income. INT. Ray. CoDE oF 1954, § 1, as amended, Revenue Act of
1964, § 111, 78 Stat. 19 (1964).
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$5,400 will save $56.60 in income taxes under the 1964 Act in 1965.
However, if the increases in the social security tax, which are pend-
ing in Congress as this is written, are passed, his social security tax
will increase by $31.20, so that the net saving will be only $25.40.
If the same taxpayer is self-employed and pays the self-employment
tax, his net tax saving will be only $8.3
As far as corporations are concerned, the new act reverses the
rates of the normal tax and the surtax with the result that for 1964
and succeeding years the corporate normal tax will be 22 percent,
as contrasted with 30 percent under prior law. Although this means
a substantial rate reduction for small corporations, the 1964 Act
raises the corporate surtax (after an exemption of $25,000) from 22
percent to 28 percent for 1964 and to 26 percent for 1965.4 Conse-
quently, in 1964 the corporate tax for larger corporations will be
50 percent, or only 2 percentage points less than the tax for 1963.
In 1965 and succeeding years the corporate tax will be 48 percent, or
4 percentage points less than the tax imposed under prior law. As a
matter of fact, it is doubtful whether larger corporations will benefit
to any extent from the new rates. Under prior law a corporation
whose estimated income tax exceeded $100,000 was required to pay
50 percent of the excess in advance during the current taxable
year. Under the 1964 Act the estimated tax payments which must
be made in advance are scheduled to be stepped up continuously,
until by 1970 corporations will be required to pay 100 percent of
their estimated income tax in excess of $100,000 in advance. This
speed-up in payment of the corporate tax should offset any benefit
that larger corporations will derive from the lower rates.
While the 1964 Act was pending in Congress, most of the dis-
cussion of the new law revolved around the wisdom of reducing taxes
in a period of prosperity when the government was already run-
ning a sizeable deficit. The justification for the apparent indiffer-
ence to national solvency manifested by the new law is embodied
in a preliminary "Declaration by Congress," which asserts that
It is the sense of Congress that the tax reduction provided by this Act
through stimulation of the economy, will, after a brief transitional period,
'U.S. News & World Report, July 20, 1964, p. 24.
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 121, 78 Stat. 25
(1964).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6154, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 122, 78 Stat.
25 (1964).
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raise (rather than lower) revenues and that such revenue increases should
first be used to eliminate the deficits in the administrative budgets and
then to reduce the public debt.6
One can only hope that congressional optimism about lower taxes
producing higher revenues will prove justified. Certainly past ex-
perience affords no basis for presuming that any increased revenues
will be used to balance the budget and pay off the public debt,
rather than finance increased expenditures.
AVERAGING
The one substantial structural achievement effected by the new
law is the introduction of a new system of income averaging.7 This
could be a significant milestone in the progress of the income tax.
One of the serious inequities of a progressive tax imposed upon
income earned in a taxable period, such as the taxable year, is that
it imposes an undue burden upon the taxpayer who has an irregular
income which "bunches" up in a single taxable period. For ex-
ample, if one lawyer earns a salary of $10,000 a year for ten years,
while another lawyer works on a single case for ten years, receiving
a contingent fee of $100,000 in the tenth year, both have equal
amounts of income over the same period. However (apart from any
relief against "bunching"), the second lawyer's tax liability will
be much greater than that of the first. The 1963 law contained a
number of haphazard, ad hoc provisions directed against bunching.
6 Revenue Act of 1964, § 1, 78 Stat. 19 (1964).7 The 1964 Act replaces §§ 1301-1307 of the 1954 Code, which permitted various
forms of averaging in specified situations, with new §§ 1301-1305. Revenue Act of
1964, § 232 (a), 78 Stat. 105 (1964). However, an individual who receives compensation
from an employment that extended over thirty-six months or more and commenced
before February 6, 1963, may still elect to compute his tax under the old provisions.
Revenue Act of 1964, § 232 (g) (2), 78 Stat. 112 (1964). The new rules also replace
the old provisions under which lump sum payments from annuity, endowment or life
insurance policies could be spread over a three year period. Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 232(b), 78 Stat. 110 (1964). They do not apply, however, to capital gains, certain
income from gifts and bequests, wagering gains, or premature payments from a self-
employed pension plan subject to the penalties prescribed by § 72 (m) (5) of the
Code. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1302 (b), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 232 (a),
78 Stat. 105 (1964). There are special rules for averaging by married couples. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1304 (c), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 232 (a), 78 Stat. 105
(1964). Moreover, averaging is limited to individual taxpayers who are citizens or
residents of the United States during the entire taxable year, and, with certain excep-
tions, may not be utilized by a taxpayer if he and his spouse furnished less than half
of his support during any base period year. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1303, as
amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 232 (a), 78 Stat. 105 (1964).
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These provisions followed no uniform pattern and laid down
different formulae for different situations, rather than providing
any general panacea for the problem of bunching. The new act
replaces these sections with a general prescription by which the tax-
payer who has an exceptionally large income in a given year is
afforded relief regardless of the source of his income. The basic
concept underlying the new provisions is simple, although like any
tax law it can get quite involved when it becomes enmeshed with
the details of a specific situation. If the taxpayer's income exceeds
one and one-third, or 133% percent, of his average income for the
previous four years, or base period, by more than $3,000, he can
compute the tax on this excess, which is called his "averageable in-
come," as though it had been received rateably over a five year
period. This is achieved by computing a tax on one-fifth of the
averageable income at the rates for the current, or computation,
year, and multiplying the result by five. Of course, the amount of
tax on one-fifth of the taxpayer's averageable income depends upon
the bracket at which the tax is computed. Generally, the tax is
computed at the bracket beginning where the tax on 133% percent
of the taxpayer's average base period income plus his average base
period capital gains leaves off. For example, suppose that a single
taxpayer's average base period income was $6,000, his income for
the computation year amounts to $12,000, and he has had no
capital gains or other income requiring special treatment under the
averaging provisions. His current income for the computation year
exceeds 133% percent of his average base period income ($8,000)
by more than $3,000 ($4,000), so he is entitled to compute the tax
under the averaging provisions. He does this by computing a tax
(ignoring deductions and exemptions) on $8,800 ($8,000 plus
one-fifth of $4,000), which amounts in 1964 to $1,994. Then he
computes a tax on $8,000, which amounts to $1,750. The difference
between these two taxes, or $244, is the tax on one-fifth of the tax-
payer's averageable income computed at the bracket above 133%
percent of his average base period income. Consequently, his total
tax is $1,750 plus five times $244, or $2,970. If the taxpayer had
chosen not to average, his tax upon an income of $12,000 would
have been $3,040. Thus, he saves $70 by averaging. Of course, the
savings due to averaging increase with the size and disproportion
of the taxpayer's income.
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CAPITAL GAINS AND LossEs
The new provisions for averaging suggest a felicitous solution
for taxing capital gains. Unfortunately, it is a solution that Con-
gress did not adopt. The 1964 Act was conceived amid talk of re-
forming some of the abuses connected with the taxation of capital
gains whereby such things as the profits from selling timber, mining
coal, raising livestock, growing crops and selling patents, along with
the gains from lump sum pension payments and stock options,
are treated as capital gains. By the time the proposed act emerged
from the House of Representatives, the crusade to separate "true"
from bogus capital gains had crystallized in the form of an addi-
tional preference for "true" capital gains. Gains from the disposi-
tion of "true" capital assets held for more than two years were to
be included in taxable income only to the extent of 40 percent,
with a maximum alternative tax of 21 percent. Other capital gains
were to be taxed as they were under the prior law, that is, 50 percent
of the gain from the disposition of assets held for over six months
was to be included in taxable income, with a maximum alternative
tax of 25 percent 8 Fortunately, this monstrosity was deleted by the
Senate Finance Committee. The campaign to reform the taxation
of capital gains ended in an extension of capital gains treatment
to royalties from mining iron ore,9 obviously an equitable result in
view of the fact that royalties from coal mines are granted the same
preferential treatment. This is about par for this type of tax re-
form.
Some minor changes were made by the 1964 Act in connection
with the computation of the capital loss carryover. The rules for
corporations were not changed. In the case of individuals, however,
the new law removes the five year limitation on the carryover of
capital losses, with the result that such losses may now be carried
over indefinitely. A capital loss carryover, which automatically be-
came a short-term loss under the prior law, retains its original char-
acter under the new law. This means that when a long-term loss is
carried over it must be offset first against long-term gains. The new
law also provides that in offsetting a net capital loss against $1,000
of ordinary income, short-term losses must be applied first.10
8 H.R. RFP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-100 (1963).
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 272, 631 (c), 1231 (b) (2), as amended, Revenue Act of
1964, § 227, 78 Stat. 97 (1964).
10 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1212, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 230, 78 Stat.
99 (1964).
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Several interesting provisions of the new law are indirectly con-
nected with the problem of taxing capital gains. One of these is
the new provision for taxing "unstated interest."" Since interest
is taxed as ordinary income, taxpayers have resorted to deferred
credit sales in order to conceal interest charges beneath a flat price,
thus converting ordinary interest income into capital gain. For
example, suppose that A is about to sell Blackacre to B for $10,000,
payable $1,000 down and in nine annual installments of $1,000
each. Instead of taking B's notes for $9,000 at 6 percent interest,
an arrangement which would yield about $2,700 in ordinary interest
income over the nine year period, A might sell the property for
$1,000 cash and nine annual installments, each in the face amount
of $1,300, in order to realize the interest as capital gain. The 1964
Act seeks to put an end to this practice by providing that where
installment payments are to be made in connection with a de-
ferred payment sale for $3,000 or more, any installment due more
than one year from the date of the sale shall be deemed to contain
an element of "unstated interest," unless the contract calls for
interest at the rate within 1 percent of a rate to be fixed by the
Treasury.12 There is a complicated statutory formula for discount-
ing future payments to determine unstated interest. The new pro-
vision for taxing unstated interest points up another evil relative
to the preferential treatment of capital gains in addition to its in-
equities. Most of the complications under the income tax are re-
ferable to the capital gains differential. Congress, however, persists
in treating symptoms rather than the disease, as is the case with
regard to the new tax on unstated interest. Instead of going to the
source of the evil and repealing the preferential tax on capital gains,
Congress seeks to prevent ordinary income from being converted
into capital gain by piecemeal legislation which is complicated and
generally ineffective.
There is another new provision in the 1964 Act which is a
classic example of legislative deviousness in dealing with capital
gains. One method of utilizing the preferential tax on capital gains
to avoid income taxes is to realize a partially taxable capital gain in
return for a fully deductible loss. For example, a taxpayer might
purchase an office building for $1,000,000, paying $100,000 in cash
I'l INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 483, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 224 (a), 78 Stat.
77 (1964).
1 Ibid.
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and taking subject to a mortgage of $900,000. Assuming that the
building has an estimated life of ten years and produces gross
rentals of $100,000 a year, the rental income may be offset entirely
by deductions for depreciation. At the end of ten years when he
has depreciated the building down to zero, the taxpayer might sell
it for $800,000. Although this would result in a capital gain of
$800,000, which would be subject to a maximum capital gains tax
of $200,000, he would have escaped a tax on $1,000,000 in rental
income, which under the prior law might have been taxed as high
as 87 percent. In 1962 Congress sought to put a stop to the capital
gains-ordinary loss gambit by adding section 1245 to the Code.
This section provides that when a taxpayer sells depreciable property
(excluding buildings and their structural components), the gain
from the sale shall be taxed as ordinary income to the extent of
depreciation deducted after 1961. This provision leaves untouched
the capital gains-ordinary loss maneuver in connection with build-
ings where the greatest abuse occurs. The 1964 Act undertakes to
remedy this omission in a peculiarly cautious and ineffective man-
ner. The new law adds section 1250 to the Code, under which gain
from the sale of a building is taxed as ordinary income to the ex-
tent of the "applicable percentage of additional depreciation" de-
ducted by the taxpayer after 1963.13 If a taxpayer sells a building
within one year after its acquisition, any gain from the sale is
taxed as ordinary income to the extent of any depreciation de-
ducted after 1963. If, however, he holds the building for longer
than one year, the taxpayer will realize no ordinary income unless
he computed the depreciation taken on the building by one of the
accelerated methods. Moreover, ordinary income treatment is
limited to the amount by which depreciation computed under
the accelerated method exceeded straight-line depreciation. Fi-
nally, even though the taxpayer used accelerated deprecia-
tion, the additional depreciation (excess of depreciation under the
accelerated method over straight-line depreciation), which is taxed
as ordinary income, is reduced by one percentage point for every
full month over twenty during which the taxpayer held the property
before disposing of it. This means, of course, that if a taxpayer
holds section 1250 property for more than ten years before disposing
:INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1250, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 231, 78
Stat. 100 (1964).
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of it, he will realize no ordinary income. It is difficult to under-
stand why Congress phrased section 1250 in the manner in which it
did, unless it wanted to insure that gains from the sale of buildings
would not be taxed as ordinary income. The logical way to deal
with the capital gains-ordinary loss gambit in connection with build-
ings would have been to extend section 1245 to that type of
property. It is difficult to see any useful purpose that is served by
computing the ordinary income derived from the sale of a building
differently from that resulting from a sale of other depreciable
property. This becomes particularly striking when it is noted
that at the same time it adopted section 1250, the 1964 Act pro-
vided that elevators and escalators should be covered under section
1245.14 This means that when a building is sold, the ordinary in-
come attributable to disposition of the building must be computed
under the formula laid down by section 1250, while that arising
from the sale of any elevators or escalators in the building must be
computed under section 1245. There is, however, a much better
solution for the capital gains-ordinary loss problem than either
section 1245 or section 1250.
Sections 1245 and 1250 represent the culmination of an in-
credibly circuitous and devious legislative scheme. Section 1221 (2)
provides that depreciable business property and business real estate
are not capital assets. If the Code stopped there, any gain from the
sale of section 1245 or section 1250 property would be ordinary gain
from the sale of a non-capital asset without the aid of those sections.
Section 1281, however, provides that any gain from the sale of
depreciable business property (which is not a capital asset under
section 1221 (2)) shall be treated as a long-term capital gain if the
property has been held for more than six months prior to its disposi-
tion, although losses from the sale of such property are denominated
ordinary losses. The forthright solution to the capital gains-
ordinary loss manoeuver would be to repeal section 1281 and tax
the gain from depreciable business property as gain from the sale
of a non-capital asset. Instead of adopting this simple solution,
however, the Code first says that depreciable business property is
not a capital asset, and then that gains from the sale of such property
shall be treated as though it were, except to the extent that the gain
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1245 (a), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (d), 78
Stat. 35 (1964).
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represents the recapture of depreciation according to the divergent
formulae laid down for buildings and other depreciable property
by sections 1245 and 1250.
The only satisfactory solution for the capital gains problem is to
repeal the differential in favor of capital gains entirely. One of the
most serious objections to the current system of taxing capital gains
is that it creates most of the complexities which attend the income
tax. Sections 1245 and 1250, along with a host of other provisions,
represent intricate legislative responses to the tax avoidance possi-
bilities of the capital gains tax which make administration of the
income tax in the way in which it is written practically impossible.
In addition, it is obvious that the capital gains tax is inequitable.
It is absurd to tax the lawyer or the doctor who works for his in,
come at roughly three times the rate enjoyed by the stock speculator.
The only argument in favor of the capital gains tax from the view-
point of individual equity is that capital gains may be earned over a
long period of time and realized in a single taxable period, so that
it is unfair to tax them at the rates applicable to regularly recurrent
income. The basis for this argument was in large measure eliminated,
however, when Congress reduced the holding period for long-
term capital gains to six months. If the argument has any merit,
the perfect answer is the new averaging provisions for irregular
income. There is certainly no reason, insofar as the equity of
the individual taxpayer is concerned, for treating capital gains
differently from other irregular income, or for conceding any
more favorable treatment to capital gains than is accorded other in-
come under the averaging provisions.
In addition to the "equity" argument, the principal contention
of the proponents of the capital gains differential has been a kind
of in terrorem policy plea. It has been argued that if capital gains
are taxed in the same manner as other income, this will discourage
people from selling appreciated assets; gains will be "locked in,"
resulting in artificial scarcities, inflation, and all sorts of vague, hort"
rendous consequences. The thing which would thaw out frozen
capital gains quicker than anything else, however, would be adoption
of the kind of provision with which Congress flirted in its deliberi
tions over the 1964 Act, but ultimately rejected. Most of the pres-
sure to keep appreciated property stems from the fact that if the
property is retained until the owner's death, it acquires a new basis:
Vol. 1964: 667]
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the fair market value of the property at the date of his death, or one
year after his death if the alternate valuation date is used in valuing
his estate for estate tax purposes. This means that if appreciated
property is retained until death, it may then be sold by the owner's
successor with no taxable income being realized. For many years
it has been argued that gain accruing to property during the owner's
life should be subjected to the income tax at his death. If this were
the case it would remove any incentive to hold appreciated prop-
erty. In fact, a man who owned appreciated property might delib-
erately sell it during his life in order to realize the gain and ease
the income tax problems of his estate following his death. Thus,
there is an equitable way in which to tax capital gains. They should
be taxed in the same manner as ordinary income, subject to the
averaging provisions in any year in which there is an unusual amount
of such gain. To remove any inducement to retain appreciated
property, gains accruing to the property during the owner's life
should be taxed at his death. Any lingering reluctance to part with
appreciated property during the owner's life might be overcome by a
general reduction in tax rates made possible by eliminating capital
gains and other loopholes in the law.
PERCENTAGE DEPLETION
Percentage depletion also affords an interesting insight into the
legislative process. Aside from the preferential treatment of capital
gains, percentage depletion represents the most indefensible loophole
in the income tax. Everyone, with the possible exception of the oil
and gas interests and their congressional satellites, admits that per-
centage depletion is unsound in principle and pernicious in practice.
Those interested in federal tax matters have long brooded over the
taxpayer who had an income of $14,000,000 from oil and gas hold-
ings, yet paid an income tax of only $80,000 (an effective rate of
6/10 of 1 percent) due to percentage depletion and its kindred hor-
ror, the expensing of intangible drilling costs. 1r For years per-
centage depletion has been like the weather: everyone talks about
it but no one does anything about it. In connection with the 1964
Act, the Kennedy administration advanced the very gentle and
modest suggestion that percentage depletion for oil and gas should
2' SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 392-93 (1960 ed.) (Statements of the
Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
81st Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1 (1950)).
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be reduced. The suggestion got nowhere. The only reference to
percentage depletion in the new law is an innocuous provision im-
posing some limitations on the aggregation of operating interests
for the purpose of computing percentage depletion. 6
CORPORATIONS
A. Multiple Corporations
The 1964 Act made some interesting innovations in the taxation
of corporations. When Congress lowered the normal tax from 30
percent to 22 percent, this increased the pressure to divide corporate
income among a number of corporations in order to obtain multiple
benefit from the $25,000 exemption against the corporate surtax.
To offset this tendency, the 1964 Act provides that a controlled group
of corporations shall be limited to a single surtax exemption which
will be prorated among the group unless they elect an unequal
division.' 7 A controlled group of corporations includes a parent-
subsidiary group connected by 80 percent stock ownership, a brother-
sister group owned to the extent of 80 percent by a single individual,
trust or estate, and combinations of parent-subsidiary and brother-
sister groups.' For example, if A owns 80 percent of the stock of X
Corporation (by voting power or value) and 80 percent of the stock
of Y Corporation, which in turn owns 80 percent of the stock of Z
Corporation, a single surtax exemption will be allowed for all three
corporations.
The denial of multiple surtax exemptions for controlled groups
of corporations is complicated by rules for determining pertinent
percentages of stock ownership or control, involving in some cases
constructive stock ownership 9 and in others disregard of certain
classes of stock.20 The denial is further complicated by an election
available to the controlled group whereby multiple surtax exemp-
tions may be taken in return for payment of a penalty tax of 6 per-
"0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 614, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 226, 78 Stat. 94
(1964).
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1561, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 235 (a), 78 Stat.
116 (1964).
'a INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1563, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 235 (a), 78 Stat.
116 (1964).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1563 (d), (e) and (f), added by Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 235 (a), 78 Stat. 116 (1964).
20 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1563 (c), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 235 (a), 78 Stat.
116 (1964).
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cent on the first $25,000 of each corporation's income.21 This is an-
other of those situations in which the taxpayer is invited to play
Russian roulette with the tax collector, and the amount of the tax
turns not upon ability to pay, but upon cleverness in tax avoidance.
Ordinarily, it will be more advantageous to elect multiple surtax
exemptions and pay the 6 percent penalty tax than to forego the
additional surtax exemptions. This follows from the fact that a
surtax exemption of $25,000 can save $7,000 in taxes in 1964 and
$6,500 in 1965, while 6 percent of $25,000 amounts to only $1,500.
In some cases, however, where the aggregate income of a group of
corporations is only slightly more than $25,000, it will be more eco-
nomical to forego multiple surtax exemptions and avoid the penalty
tax.2
2
Even before the new law denied multiple surtax exemptions to
a controlled group of corporations, section 1551 provided that when
one corporation transferred property to another new or inactive
corporation, and after the transfer, the transferor or its stock-
holders, or both, were in 80 percent control of the transferee, the
transferee could not claim a surtax exemption (or for that matter
a credit against the accumulated earnings tax), unless it established
by a clear preponderance of evidence that securing the exemption
(or credit) was not a major purpose of the transfer. Section 1551 did
not apply, however, to a transfer of money by one corporation to
another. The 1964 Act broadens section 1551 to cover indirect
transfers of property by one corporation to another, thus embracing
any transfer of money where the transferee corporation uses the
money to purchase property from the transferor. Under the 1964
Act section 1551 also includes direct or indirect transfers of property
by five or fewer individuals to a corporation where the transferors
are in control of another corporation.
23
In a further effort to discourage multiple corporations, the 1964
2 1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1562, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 235 (a), 78 Stat.
116 (1964).
22 For example, in 1964 a group of five corporations, each having taxable income
of $40,000, will pay a tax of $93,000 if they do not elect multiple surtax exemptions,
as contrasted with a tax of only $72,500 if they do so elect. However, a group of three
corporations with taxable incomes of $20,000, $6,000 and $4,000 will pay a tax of $8,400
if they elect multiple surtax exemptions, as contrasted with a tax of $8,000 if they
do not do so.
23 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1551, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 235 (b), 78
Stat. 125 (1964).
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Act repealed the 2 percent additional tax on consolidated returns.24
At the same time Congress provided that an affiliated group of
corporations choosing not to file a consolidated return may elect a
100 percent deduction for intercorporate dividends. 25 If this election
is made, however, the affiliated group is limited to (a) one surtax
exemption; (b) one $100,000 credit against the accumulated earn-
ings tax; (c) one $100,000 annual deduction for exploration ex-
penses, with an overall ceiling of $400,000; (d) one $100,000 ex-
emption for filing estimated tax returns; (e) one $25,000 limitation
on the small business deduction of life insurance companies under
sections 804 (a) (4) and 809 (d) (10). Moreover, all of the corpora-
tions in the group must elect to treat foreign income taxes as either
a deduction or a credit, and, if they elect the credit, all must make
the same election about the "per country" or "overall" limitation
on the credit.26
One of the interesting things about the new provisions dealing
with multiple corporations is that they represent a very complicated
solution to a problem which should not even exist. The tax
fact which creates the pressure to multiply surtax exemptions
is the progressive corporate income tax. Since there is no
rational basis for a graduated corporate income tax that is totally
unrelated to the ability of the stockholders, who are in fact the
owners of the corporation, to pay the tax, it seems obvious that the
simplest way to solve the problem of multiple surtax exemptions
would be to repeal the progressive corporate income tax in favor of
a flat tax with no exemptions.2 7 Unfortunately, the new provisions
relating to controlled corporate groups illustrate a common method
of dealing with tax problems. Instead of striking directly at the
heart of a problem by excising the offensive provision that creates
the problem, legislatures are prone to attack indirectly with a myriad
of complex provisions calculated to contain the more baleful con-
sequences of the problem. This is, for example, precisely the tech-
2" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1503 (a), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 234(a), 78
Stat. 113 (1964).
-" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 243, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 214 (a), 78
Stat. 52 (1964).
2" INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 243 (b) (3), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 214(a), 78
Stat. 52 (1964).
27 At times corporate income has been taxed at a uniform rate by the federal govern-
ment while at other times the corporate tax has been graduated. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
WoRLD TAx SEuS: TAXATION IN THE UNrrED STATES 113 (1963).
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nique that has been adopted for dealing with the problem of capital
gains. Instead of denying the capital gains myth and repealing
the tax preference in favor of such gains, Congress has embraced the
capital gains illusion as a fundamental article of tax faith, while at
the same time multiplying prophylactic provisions designed to pre-
vent its poison from corrupting the income tax completely.
B. Stockholders
When the 1954 Code, in an effort to mitigate the double taxa-
tion of corporate income, provided that domestic dividends received
by individual stockholders should be excluded from gross income
to the extent of $50 ($100 in the case of a joint return), with an
additional credit of 4 percent of the balance of the dividends
against the stockholder's tax, these provisions were attacked as an
unwarranted discrimination in favor of wealthy taxpayers. This
attack culminated in the repeal of the dividend credit over a two
year period by the 1964 Act. The credit is reduced to 2 percent in
1964, and abolished entirely in 1965.28 The new law continues,
however, to pay lip-service to the double taxation argument by
increasing the dividend exclusion from $50 to $100 ($200 in the case
of joint returns).29 Although the committee report declares that
repealing the credit "removes the discrimination in present law in
favor of high bracket shareholders," 30 It is difficult to see why the
increased exclusion, which may be worth $77 to a taxpayer in the
top 1964 bracket and only $16 to a taxpayer in the bottom bracket, is
so patently nondiscriminatory.
C. Personal Holding Companies
The vigor with which the 1964 Act attacks personal holding
companies would seem to indicate that few congressmen number
personal holding companies among their constituents. The 1964
Act begins by abolishing the nonsensical graduated personal hold-
ing company tax of 75 percent on the first $2,000 of undistributed
personal holding company income and 85 percent of the balance,
in favor of a lower flat rate of 70 percent.8 1 Actually, however, on
28 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 34 (a), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 201 (a) and
(b), 78 Stat. 81 (1964).
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 116 (a), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 201 (c), 78
Stat. 32 (1964).
80 H.R. RaP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1963).
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 541, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 225 (a), 78
Stat. 79 (1964).
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a comparative basis, this raises the tax. Under prior law the rates
of the personal holding company tax were somewhat lower than
the maximum individual tax rate. The 1964 Act, on the other
hand, sets the personal holding company tax at the maximum 1965
individual rate.
In general, a personal holding company is a closely held family
corporation, the income of which is predominantly passive income
from investments. More specifically, there are two requisites for a
personal holding company: its stock must be held by a limited num-
ber of stockholders, and a certain proportion of its income must be
personal holding company income. In the past, taxpayers have
avoided the personal holding company tax by either diversifying
the stock ownership of a corporation, or making sure that enough
of its income was other than personal holding company income to
keep it out of the personal holding company category. Personal
holding companies were frequently used to shelter dividend income
which, when realized through a corporation, is taxed at only a frac-
tion of the rate applicable to such income when it is received by an
individual, due to the intercorporate dividend deduction. For ex-
ample, if a corporation whose income does not exceed $25,000 re-
ceives dividend income, the tax on this income is only 3.3 percent
(22 percent of 15 percent), due to the 85 percent deduction for
intercorporate dividends. If the corporate income is taxed at 50
percent, the tax on the dividends will be only 7.5 percent (50 per-
cent of 15 percent).
Since a stockholder in a personal holding company is regarded
as owning not only the stock that he owns directly, but also the
stock which is owned by other members of his family and various
legal entities in which he is interested, it is difficult to remove a
family corporation from the personal holding company category by
diversifying stock ownership. Consequently, the 1964 Act does not
tamper substantially with the stock ownership requirement for per-
sonal holding companies. Before the 1964 Act, however, it was
comparatively easy to escape the personal holding company tax
by diversifying corporate income. The 1964 Act makes a determined
effort to prevent this type of tax avoidance. Under prior law a
company was not classified as a personal holding company unless
80 percent of its gross income was personal holding company income.
The 1964 Act reduces the fatal percentage that will lead to personal
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holding company classification to 60 percent. 32 Moreover, under
prior law personal holding company income was compared with gross
income, including capital gains, in order to determine if the statutory
percentage was present. Since only capital gains from the sale or
exchange of stocks, securities and commodity futures were treated as
personal holding company income, a corporation could escape per-
sonal holding company status by realizing capital gains from the sale
of other types of property, thus raising the corporation's gross in-
come so that it would no longer have the fatal percentage of personal
holding company income. This particular loophole is closed by the
1964 Act through the exclusion of capital gains from both personal
holding company income and the income with which personal
holding company income is compared in order to determine if the
requisite percentage exists.33 Under prior law if gross income from
rents exceeded 50 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income,
the rental income was not treated as personal holding company in-
come. This meant that a substantial amount of dividend income
could be sheltered in a personal holding company if rental property
yielding a large gross income was also transferred to the corporation.
For example, a man might transfer stocks yielding dividends of
$50,000 a year to a wholly owned corporation. If he also transferred
rental property yielding gross rents of $51,000 to the corporation,
this would prevent the corporation from being classified as a personal
holding company, even though the net rentals from the property
only amounted to a nominal sum. This is no longer possible under
the 1964 Act. Rents are still excluded from classification as per-
sonal holding company income, provided adjusted income from
rents exceeds 50 percent of the company's adjusted ordinary gross
income and meets certain other requirements. The rentals which
are taken into account in order to determine whether such income
constitutes personal holding company income must first be reduced
by subtracting deductions for depreciation, amortization, property
taxes, interest and rents attributable to the rental income. The
rental income thus adjusted is then compared with the corporation's
total adjusted ordinary income, and only if the adjusted rental in-
come exceeds 50 percent of the company's other income will it es-
32 INT. REv. CODE op 1954, § 542 (a), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 225 (b), 78
Stat. 79 (1964).
33 INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 543 (b) (1), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 225 (d),
18 Stat. 81 (1964).
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cape classification as personal holding company income.3 4 In the
hypothetical case referred to above, for example, if the gross income
from rents was $51,000 and the adjusted rental income amounted to
only $1,000, the company's adjusted rental income would be less
than 2 percent of its total adjusted income. Thus, 100 percent of
the company's income would be personal holding company income
under the 1964 Act. The act lays down somewhat similar rules under
which income from mineral, oil and gas royalties must also be re-
duced by certain deductions before being compared with a corpora-
tion's adjusted income to determine whether there is a sufficient
percentage of income from these sources so that it will not be
classified as personal holding company income.3 5 There are various
other provisions designed to tighten loopholes under the personal
holding company tax, as well as some escape hatches which are pro-
vided for corporations classified as personal holding companies under
the new law, but not so classified during at least one of the two years
preceding enactment of the new law.36
It would be naive to assume that Congress has successfully plugged
all of the loopholes in the personal holding company tax. Many of
the old loopholes have been eliminated, however, and the new law
should at least challenge the ingenuity of tax lawyers in finding
new ones. One line of inquiry that the 1964 Act seems to have over-
looked in its approach to personal holding companies is whether
there is a more satisfactory solution to the problem presented by the
personal holding company than the personal holding company tax.
The success of a personal holding company depends not only upon
the ability of the shareholders to accumulate income in a corpora-
tion, but also upon their being able to eventually withdraw the ac-
cumulations from the corporation without incurring more than
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 543 (a) (7), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 225 (d),
78 Stat. 81 (1964).
" INT. RV. CODE OF 1954, § 543 (a) (3), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 225 (d),
78 Stat. 81 (1964).
11 The personal holding company tax was extensively revised by § 225 of the 1964
Act. The text discusses only a few highlights of the revision. Some changes were also
made in connection with foreign personal holding companies. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 553, 554, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 225 (e), 78 Stat. 85 (1964). One pro-
vision dealing with foreign personal holding companies increases the basis for in-
herited stock in such a company by adding to the decedent's basis for the stock, the pro-
portionate part of the estate tax paid in connection with the excess of the value of the
stock over his basis. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 1022, added by Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 225 (j) (1), 78 Stat. 92 (1964) (former § 1022 redesignated as § 1023).
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nominal tax liability. Such withdrawals are possible under the
present law because of the fact that when a corporation is liquidated,
the redemption of the stockholders' shares is treated as a sale of the
stock to the corporation. This means that the profits accumulated in
a personal holding company can be withdrawn at capital gains rates
by liquidating the corporation or selling its stock. Withdrawal of
the profits may be accomplished without any tax liability at all if
they are retained by the corporation until the stockholder dies and
his stock acquires a stepped-up basis. If the capital gains differential
and the stepped-up basis for property at death were eliminated
from the income tax, the personal holding company would be a
much less appealing device, and the need for a special personal
holding company tax might well be obviated.
D. Employee Stock Options
One of the provisions of the income tax which, along with capital
gains and percentage depletion, deserves classification as totally
unwarranted tax preference is the restricted stock option. The
restricted stock option is a device whereby highly compensated
corporate executives may receive additional salary payments which
are exempt from the income tax. Under a restricted stock option,
a corporation gives an executive the privilege of purchasing its stock
at a price equal to a prescribed percentage of the stock's value. If
the statutory formula is followed, the executive will realize no in-
come either when he receives the option or when he exercises it.
When the stock acquired under the option is sold, the executive
will realize only a capital gain, and if the stock is retained until his
death it can be sold completely free of income tax consequences.
The 1964 Act undertakes to reform restricted stock options by
reclassifying them as "qualified stock options" and "employee stock
purchase plans."37
The qualified stock option is simply the old restricted stock
option with a few additional formal requirements that will not im-
pair its usefulness as a device to avoid income taxes. In order for
an option to be classified as a qualified stock option under the new
law, the option price must be 100 percent of the value of the stock
at the time the option is issued, instead of the old requirement of at
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421, 6652 (a), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 221,
78 Stat. 63 (1964); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 422-25, 6039, added by Revenue Act of
1964, § 221, 78 Stat. 63 (1964) (former § 6039 redesignated as § 6040).
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least 85 percent. The executive must hold the stock acquired under
the option for three years before disposing of it, as contrasted with
the requirement under prior law that he not dispose of the stock
within two years from the date when the option was issued nor with-
in six months from the date he acquired the stock. The qualified
stock option must have stockholder approval and may run for only
five years, as opposed to ten years under prior law. Moreover, the
option must not be issued to a person owning stock possessing more
than 5 percent of the voting power of the corporation, its parent
or a subsidiary.38
Employee stock purchase plans are subject to substantially the
same conditions as the old restricted stock option. The only sig-
nificant difference is that an employee stock purchase plan must be
generally available to employees upon a nondiscriminatory basis
analogous to the nondiscriminatory coverage required for a quali-
fied pension or profit-sharing plan.39
The tragic aspect of the treatment of stock options under the
1964 Act lies not in the failure of the act to achieve any real reform,
but in the fact that by undertaking to reform rather than abolish
restricted stock options, the 1964 Act may have perpetuated another
unfortunate tax myth.
Stock options are simply a method of compensating employees
in kind. There is no practical difference between paying an em-
ployee in stock and giving him the privilege of buying stock for
less than its value. The only meaningful reform possible in connec-
tion with restricted stock options would be to repeal the provisions
freeing such options from the income tax. If this were the case
restricted stock options would be taxed as ordinary compensation. 40
The unfortunate effect of attempts to "reform" rather than abolish
the preferential taxation of stock options is that this gives the errone-
ous impression that there are certain types of stock options which
merit preferential tax treatment. This is, of course, what has hap-
pened in connection with capital gains. There has been so much dis-
cussion about how capital gains should be taxed, that many people
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 221 (a), 78 Stat. 63
(1964).
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 423, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 221 (a), 78 Stat. 63
(1964).
10Apart from any statutory exemption, restricted stock options have been held
taxable as ordinary compensation by the Supreme Court. Commissioner v. LoBue,
351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
Vol. 1964: 667]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
now conceive of the term capital gains as representing economic
objectivity which is entitled to special tax treatment, rather than
simply a shorthand expression for a type of income to which the
income tax statute accords preferential treatment.
E. Miscellaneous
The 1964 Act made several miscellaneous adjustments in the
taxation of corporations designed to iron out inequities in the prior
law. Thus, for example, where there is a stock acquisition, or so-
called "B," reorganization, the acquiring corporation may now
transfer not only its own voting stock, but the voting stock of its
parent. Furthermore, the acquiring corporation may pass on to a
subsidiary the stock it acquires.41 This makes applicable to a "B"
reorganization the same rules which prevail in the case of a "C," or
asset acquisition, reorganization.
Several minor amendments were made in the provisions dealing
with regulated investment companies. The time for mailing notices
to stockholders setting forth the amounts taxable to stockholders
has been extended from thirty to forty-five days from the end of the
taxable year.42 Moreover, a provision was inserted to allow a unit
investment trust to sell its assets in order to redeem shares without
being considered to have made a preferential distribution that will
deprive it of a dividends-paid deduction for the capital gain realized
on the sale and distributed to the shareholder.
43
Finally, the new law makes several minor changes in connection
with the election of small business corporations to be taxed under
Subchapter S. A subchapter S corporation may now have an in-
active affiliate without losing its subchapter S status.44 Moreover, if
certain formalities are observed capital gains distributed to stock-
holders of a subchapter S corporation by the 15th day of the third
month following the close of the taxable year will be treated as
having been paid within the taxable year.45
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (B), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, §
218 (a), 78 Stat. 57 (1964).
•2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 852-55, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 229 (a), 78
Stat. 99 (1964).
,3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 852 (d), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 229 (b), 78
Stat. 99 (1964).
4" INT. Ryv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (d), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 233 (a), 78
Stat. 112 (1964).
"5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375 (e), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 233 (b), 78
Stat. 112 (1964).
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EXCLUSIONS
The 1964 Act added one new exclusion from gross income to the
Code and made noteworthy changes in many of the old ones.
As part of a continuing concern over senior citizens, the 1964 Act
provides that a person sixty-five years of age or older who sells
property which he has occupied as his principal residence for at least
five of the preceding eight years, may elect to exclude the gain from
the sale from his gross income, provided the adjusted sale price does
not exceed $20,000.46 If the adjusted sale price exceeds $20,000, the
taxpayer may exclude part of the gain proportionate to the ratio be-
tween $20,000 and the adjusted sale price. For example, if A, after at-
taining age sixty-five,47 sells his residence which has a basis of $21,000
for $30,000, he may exclude $6,000 ($20,000/$30,000 of the $9,000
gain) from his gross income. It is perhaps worth noting that the new
exclusion operates independently of the preexisting privilege of avoid-
ing the recognition of gain from the sale of a residence by investing in
a new residence, within a prescribed period, the adjusted sale price
received from the sale of an old residence.4 8 Thus, in the hypo-
thetical case above if the taxpayer invests at least $24,000 in a new
residence he will realize no taxable income. In determining the
amount which must be invested in a new residence in order to avoid
a tax under the preexisting provision, any gain excluded under the
new section is ignored. Of course the two provisions operate on
different principles. The new exclusion is an exclusion; the gain
exempted under that provision is ignored entirely and does not
reduce the basis of any new residence acquired by the taxpayer.
On the other hand, the gain which is disregarded under the older
section is postponed rather than exempted, and to the extent that
it is not recognized, the gain reduces the basis of the new residence.
The new exclusion for gains from the sale of residences by senior
citizens seems ill-advised. As is the case with so many tax exemptions,
the new exclusion appears to be a generous gesture when it is viewed
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 121, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 206 (a), 78 Stat. 38
(1964) (former § 121 redesignated as § 122).
'7 The new exclusion does not apply unless the taxpayer has attained age sixty-five
at the time of the sale. It is not enough that he is sixty-five at the end of the taxable
year in which the sale is made.
"8 Any taxpayer, regardless of age, who sells his principal residence at a gain may
avoid recognition of the gain if within one year before or after the sale, he invests the
adjusted sale price of the old residence in a new residence. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1034.
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in isolation. Upon comparative consideration, however, its true
preferential character emerges. There is no particular reason why
wealthy persons should not shoulder their proportionate share of the
tax burden regardless of age. The exemption of a person from the
income tax on the basis of age rather than economic status is diffi-
cult to justify. The new exclusion is part of an expanding pattern
of tax preferences for older persons which finds expression in the
additional $600 old-age exemption, 49 the increased deduction allow-
ances for medical care expenses of elderly persons 0 (which were
further increased by the 1964 Act),5 ' and the retirement income
credit.5 2
In addition to creating the new exclusion for senior citizens, the
1964 Act made adjustments in several of the existing exclusions. The
previously discussed exclusion for domestic dividends received by
individual shareholders was doubled by the 1964 Act.53
Several exclusions were reduced by the new law. By virtue of
long-standing regulations, group life insurance premiums paid for
employees by an employer have been excluded from the employees'
income.54 The 1964 Act taxes such premiums to employees to the
extent that the group insurance coverage of an employee exceeds
$50,000.5 The premium that the employee must include in his gross
income is computed from a uniform table prescribed by the com-
mittee reports 6 pending dissemination of a table by the Treasury.
The amount taxed to the employee is the premium computed under
this table for any group insurance coverage in excess of $50,000,
less any contributions which the employee makes to the insurance.
The new tax on group life insurance premiums seems sound. This
is the kind of fringe benefit the value of which is readily computed
and which represents additional compensation (rather than a work-
ing condition) to the employee. The only question that can legiti-
mately be raised in connection with the new provision is whether it
'9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 151 (c).
"
0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (a) and (g).
9 1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (b), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 211 (a), 78
Stat. 49 (1964).
G2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 37, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 202, 78 Stat. 33
(1964).
53 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
1' Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2 (d) (2) (1957).
r5 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 79, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 204 (a), 78 Stat. 36
(1964).
"' H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1963).
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goes far enough. If group life insurance represents the kind of
benefit which should be treated as part of the taxable income of an
employee, why stop short of taxing the entire amount of the benefit
to the employee? When the proposed act initially emerged from the
House, the amount to be taxed to the employee was the premium
for coverage in excess of $30,000. 57 This figure was raised to $70,000
by the Senate,58 and was finally fixed at $50,000 by a conference com-
mittee.9 It might well have been lowered.
The changes made in connection with the sick pay exclusion by
the 1964 Act illustrates the unhappy results of legislation by com-
promise, a technique often employed in the passage of tax laws.
Under prior law sick pay up to $100 a week was excluded from an
employee's income after a waiting period of seven days in the case
of illness not resulting from injury. The waiting period was waived
in the event that the employee was hospitalized for one day during
the period of illness. The House decided that this exclusion en-
couraged malingering, and provided under the 1964 Act that the
sick pay exclusion should not apply until the employee had been
away from work for thirty days. 0 The Senate felt that this was too
rigorous. Accordingly, in its final form the 1964 Act provides for
the exclusion of sick pay up to $100 a week after an employee has
been absent from work for thirty days due to illness or injury. Dur-
ing the first thirty days of an absence, however, a sick pay exclusion
limited to $75 a week is allowed, with a waiting period of seven
days in the case of both illness and injury unless the employee is
hospitalized for one day during the period of absence. The exclusion
during the first thirty days is further conditioned upon sick pay bene-
fits being limited to 75 percent of the employee's regular compensa-
tion. If the payments exceed this amount, no exclusion for sick pay
is allowed during the first thirty days.,' It is difficult to see any
reason for the 75 percent limitation imposed by the new provision
which can only serve to discriminate against low paid employees
and generous employers. For example, suppose that two employees
are absent from work for thirty days due to illness, and each is hos-
5' H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 42 (1963).
58 S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1964).
DH.R. REP. No. 1149, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964) (conference report).
60 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1963).01 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 105 (d), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 205, 78 Stat.
38 (1964).
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pitalized for more than one day during the absence. Their em-
ployer pays each of them $100 a week while they are ill. One em-
ployee's regular salary is $150 a week, while the other earns only
$100. The employee who earns $150 a week may exclude sick pay
of $75 a week, since the $100 that he receives does not exceed 75
percent of his regular compensation. The other employee, however,
although receiving exactly the same amount during the period of
absence, is entitled to no exclusion at all, since the amount he re-
ceives exceeds 75 percent of his regular compensation.
The 1964 Act made one minor change in connection with the
exclusion of earned income by non-resident citizens. Under prior
law a non-resident citizen was entitled to exclude foreign earnings
of $35,000 a year from gross income after he had been a non-resident
for three years. Under the 1964 Act this exclusion is reduced to
$25,000.2
NEw DEDUCTIONS
The 1964 Act, although originally advertised as a measure de-
signed to reduce deductions and broaden the tax base, initiated
several new deductions. The additional deduction of significance
to the greatest number of persons is probably the minimum standard
deduction. Under preexisting provisions a taxpayer was given the op-
tion of itemizing and deducting his "other" deductions or taking a
standard deduction of 10 percent of his adjusted gross income.
The standard deduction was limited to $1,000 except in the case of
married persons filing separate returns where the ceiling on the
standard deduction was $500 for each spouse. The 1964 Act provides
that the taxpayer who elects the standard deduction shall deduct the
larger of the 10 percent deduction or a new minimum standard de-
duction of $200 ($100 in the case of a married person filing a
separate return), plus $100 times the number of exemptions claimed
by the taxpayer.63 The ceilings for the minimum standard deduction
are the same as the ceilings on the 10 percent deduction. A taxpayer
still has his option of itemizing deductions or claiming the standard
deduction. Once he has elected the standard deduction, however,
he does not have the option of claiming the 10 percent deduction or
62 INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 911 (c) (1) (B), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 237,
78 Stat. 128 (1964.)
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 141 (c), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 112 (a), 78
Stat. 23 (1964).
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the minimum standard deduction. He must take the larger. An ex-
ception is made to this rule in the case of a married person filing
a separate return. Where married taxpayers file separate returns,
one spouse may not use the minimum standard deduction if the
other spouse uses the 10 percent deduction. If, however, one spouse
uses the minimum standard deduction, the other spouse may also
take the minimum standard deduction in order to achieve the lowest
overall tax for both spouses, even though it is less than the 10 per-
cent deduction for that spouse.64
The minimum standard deduction, which is keyed to the tax-
payer's status rather than his income, really represents an increase
in the personal exemptions of low-bracket taxpayers which will
eliminate a number of these persons from the tax rolls. Under prior
law, for example, a single person did not encounter the income tax
until his income exceeded $667 (allowing for a $600 exemption
and a $67 standard deduction). Under the minimum standard
deduction such persons will not be subject to the income tax until
their income exceeds $900 ($600 exemption plus a $300 minimum
deduction). Married taxpayers encountered the income tax when
their incomes exceeded $1,333 under the old law. They can now
earn $1,600 without being subjected to the tax.
A number of taxpayers will be affected by a new deduction for
moving expenses provided by the 1964 Act. Under prior law (apart
from one Tax Court decision)"5 employees were not allowed to de-
duct the cost of moving to a new job, since this was regarded as a
personal expense. A partial exception to this rule was made when
an employee moved at the behest of an existing employer and was
reimbursed by the employer for his expenses. The employee was
allowed to exclude the reimbursement from his gross income, al-
though he was not allowed to deduct any additional expenses for
which he was not reimbursed.66 Moreover, in the case of a new em-
ployee moving to a job, neither an exclusion nor a deduction was
allowed for his moving expenses. The new law permits both the
new and the old employee to deduct moving expenses. 67 Reimbursed
o' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 141 (d), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 112 (a), '78
Stat. 23 (1964).
01 Walter H. Mendel, 41 T.C. 32 (1963).
00 Rev. Rul. 429, 1954-2 C m. BULL. 53.
07 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 213, 78 Stat. 50
(1964) (former § 217 redesignated as § 218). Moving expenses are deducted in com-
puting adjusted gross income. This means, of course, that the taxpayer may deduct
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expenses of existing employees, however, apparently continue to
be excluded from the employees' gross income under prior law,
rather than being deducted under the new Act. 8 Although an ex-
clusion operates in much the same way as a deduction insofar as
its effect on tax liability is concerned, this distinction can be im-
portant. In order to deduct moving expenses under the new law,
the employee must work in the place to which he moves for at least
thirty-nine weeks out of the year following the move, although not
necessarily for the same employer.69 If he fails to work for this
period the employee forfeits the deduction. This limitation does not
seem to apply, however, to the old employee who is reimbursed for his
moving expenses and excludes the reimbursement from his gross
income. Apart from the phrasing of the new provision, it is difficult
to see any justification for this distinction.
Moving expenses are defined by the statute as the cost of moving
the household goods and personal effects of the taxpayer and the
members of his household, along with living expenses in transit70
The new provision states that the taxpayer's new principal place of
work must be "at least 20 miles farther from his former residence
that was his former place of work."''71 Since the statute conditions
the deduction for moving expenses upon the distance between the
taxpayer's new place of work and his former residence, rather than
the distance between his old and new homes, it would be possible
under the literal wording of the statute for the taxpayer to incur
deductible moving expenses by moving into the house adjacent to his
old home upon being transferred to a new place of work twenty miles
further from his old residence than was his old place of work. In such
moving expenses even though he elects the standard deduction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 62, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 213 (b), 78 Stat. 52 (1964).
OS "No deduction is provided under this provision for moving expenses for which
the taxpayer receives reimbursements which are not included in his gross income.
Thus, existing employees may continue to exclude reimbursed moving expenses from
their gross income in the same manner as under present law. Their status, in this
regard, is left entirely unchanged." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1963).
09 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 217 (c) (2), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 213 (a), 78
Stat. 50 (1964).
70INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 217 (b), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 213 (a), 78
Stat. 50 (1964).
71 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 217 (c) (1) (A), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 213 (a),
78 stat. 50 (1964). If the taxpayer had no former principal place of work, his new
place of work must be at least twenty miles away from his former residence. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 217 (c) (1) (B), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 213 (a), 78 Stat. 50
(1964).
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a case, however, it would appear that the change in residence was not
motivated by the change in the taxpayer's place of work, and, there-
fore, that the expenses incurred were not really deductible moving
expenses.
Several years ago the Service ruled that losses attributable to ex-
propriation of business and investment properties by the Cuban
government were deductible.7 2 Prior to the 1964 Act, however, no
deduction at all was allowed for losses resulting from Cuban ex-
propriation of non-business or non-investment property such as a
taxpayer's personal residence, since these losses were not incurred in
connection with a trade or business or a transaction entered into
for profit. Castro, although an international disaster, was not re-
garded as a casualty in the tax sense. The 1964 Act provides that
losses resulting from Cuban expropriation of personal property
shall be deductible as casualty losses.73 Due to an oversight the
1964 Act failed to specify an effective date for this provision. This
has been remedied by subsequent legislation which provides for the
deduction of losses sustained after 1958 and before 1964.74 The
amendatory legislation also allows the deduction of losses attributable
to expropriation of intangible non-business and non-investment
property such as bank accounts, although casualty losses ordinarily
are limited to tangible property. The 1964 Act provides that tax-
payers who have sustained foreign expropriation losses may elect to
carry them over for ten years.75
The new provision for taxing the unstated interest element in
deferred payment contracts also provides a correlative deduction
for such interest.7 6 There is another new deduction for interest
in the form of carrying charges in connection with educational con-
tracts. Under a preexisting provision a taxpayer who purchases
7" Rev. Rul. 197, 1962-2 Gun. BULL. 66.
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (i), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 238, 78 Stat.
128 (1964) (former § 165 (i) redesignated as § 165 (j)).
71 Pub. L. No. 348, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (June 30, 1964).
7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 210, 78 Stat. 4.7
(1964). Losses due to expropriation by any foreign power may be carried over for
ten years at the taxpayer's election if the expropriation losses account for at least
50% of the taxpayer's net operating loss for the taxable year. If the ten year carry.
over is elected there will be no carryback. That portion of the operating loss which
is not due to expropriation, however, will continue to be carried back for three years
and forvard for five years.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 483, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 224 (a), 78 Stat. 77
(1964).
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goods on credit is allowed to deduct part of the carrying charges in
connection with the sale equal to 6 percent of the average unpaid
monthly balance during the taxable year.77 This same privilege
is extended by the 1964 Act to carrying charges in connection with
contracts for the purchase of educational services.78
SOME NEw PROVISIONS FOR OLD DEDUCTIONS
New limitations were imposed on a number of existing deduc-
tions by the 1964 Act, but these were more than offset by generous
treatment of other items. One of the popular panaceas for reform-
ing the federal income tax involves broadening the tax base in order
to reduce the rates of the tax. This would be accomplished by the
elimination of such personal deductions as those for personal taxes,
interest on personal loans, and casualty losses of pleasure property.
As a tentative step in this direction the administration proposed in
connection with the 1964 Act that personal deductions be disallowed
except to the extent that they exceeded a prescribed percentage of
the taxpayer's income. This proposal might have received a warmer
reception if it had taken the form of a recommendation to abolish
the deductions entirely. The purport of the proposal was obscured
by the percentage qualification which, although designed to limit
personal deductions to extraordinary expenses, was regarded by
many as a purely arbitrary provision. At any rate the suggestion
was received by the public with an almost complete lack of com-
prehension and greeted in Congress with an equal lack of enthusi-
asm. The 1964 Act did impose some minor limitations on the de-
ductions of taxes, casualty losses of non-business property, charitable
contributions, and interest. These were offset, however, by more
liberal treatment of charitable contributions, medical expenses, ex-
penses of child and dependent care, and expenses of combined
business and pleasure trips.
With certain stated exceptions taxes were deductible under prior
law. The 1964 Act limits the deduction for taxes to those ex-
plicitly stated to be deductible7" which do not fall within an
'17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163 (b).
78 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163 (b), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 224 (c), 78
Stat. 79 (1964).
70 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 164, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 207 (a), 78
Stat. 40 (1964).
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enumeration explicitly declared to be nondeductible. 0 Taxes no
longer deductible because of the new provision include foreign
personal property taxes and foreign, state and local excises, other
than state and local general sales taxes and taxes on gasoline. Thus,
for example, it is no longer permissible to deduct state taxes on
liquor, tobacco, auto registrations or drivers' licenses. The new law
provides, however, that nondeductible state, local and foreign taxes
"shall be allowed as a deduction [if they] ...are paid or accrued
within the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business or an ac-
tivity described in section 212 (relating to expenses for production
of income).""' It is arguable that these items will be deductible as
taxes rather than business or non-business expenses, and, therefore,
should be fully deductible even though they are capital in nature.
For example, a state transfer tax paid in connection with the purchase
of stock should be currently deductible rather than treated as a
capital addition to the basis of the stock. 2
Casualty losses of personal (in the sense of non-business) property
are still deductible under the 1964 Act, although the first $100 of
each such loss is disallowed. 3 The disallowance does not apply to
casualty losses connected with a trade or business or a transaction
entered into for profit. The committee reports suggest that the $100
disallowance will be construed liberally. Thus, a single force in-
flicting damage upon several pieces of property will be treated as a
single casualty insofar as disallowing $100 of the loss is concerned.84
Moreover, on a joint return spouses will be treated as a single tax-
payer for purposes of determining the $100 disallowance. For ex-
ample, suppose that a thief breaks into a residence and steals a man's
watch and a bracelet belonging to his wife. Assuming that the
watch had a cost and value of $150 and the bracelet had a cost and
80 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 275, added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 207 (b) (3) (A), 78
Stat. 42 (1964).
8' INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, § 164, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 207 (a), 78
Stat. 40 (1964).
82 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAx 116 (1964).
83 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (c) (3), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 208 (a),
78 Stat. 43 (1964).
14 "For this purpose, in determining what is a single casualty, it is intended that the
law be interpreted liberally. Thus, for example, where an individual's property is
damaged by wind from a hurricane and this is followed by additional damage resulting
from water, it is intended that the combination of these events be treated as one
casualty and, therefore, that all amounts over $100 damage be deductible." H.R. REP.
No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1963).
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value of $250, the couple can deduct $300 as a theft loss on a joint
return. On the other hand, if they file separate returns the husband
may claim a deduction of only $50, and the wife will be limited to
a deduction of $150.85
The 1964 Act forbids the deduction of interest on loans which
are part of a plan to systematically borrow amounts equal to part or
all of the increase in the cash surrender values of insurance policies
in order to pay part or all of the premiums on the policies. There
are four exceptions to the new rule under which interest on such a
loan is deductible: (1) where any four of the first seven annual
premiums are paid with funds that are not borrowed; (2) where
the total interest on such loans for the taxable year does not exceed
$100; (3) where the loans were incurred because of an "unforeseen
substantial loss of income or unforeseen substantial increase in
financial obligations"; and (4) where the loan was incurred in con-
nection with the taxpayer's trade or business.8 6 It requires no par-
ticular prescience to foresee that this provision is going to be diffi-
cult to administer. It is part of a complex scheme designed to deny
an interest deduction in connection with loans incurred to purchase
life insurance and annuities.87 These provisions do not represent
the happiest solution for the problem they are intended to solve.
The simplest and most equitable way in which to deal with the
deduction of interest on loans incurred to purchase insurance
policies would be the enactment of a general provision denying
any deduction for interest on personal loans. There is no obvious
BG "The $100 limitation applies to a joint return by a husband and wife as well as to a
separate return of either. Thus, if a hpsband and wife file separate returns, each is
subject to a separate $100 floor with respect to each casualty or theft, while, if they
file a joint return, they are together subject to only one $100 floor with respect to
each casualty or theft whether the loss is sustained with respect to jointly, or separately,
owned property." Ibid.
So INT. R V. CODE OF 1954, § 264, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 215, 78 Stat. 55
(1964).
8? Before the 1964 Act, INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 264 (a) (2) forbade the deduction
of interest in connection with an "indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or
carry a single premium life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract" according to
the expansive definition of such contracts set forth in § 264 (b). In this connection it
should be noted that another Code section which denies an interest deduction was
amended by the 1964 Act. The new law adds a sentence to § 265 of the Code (dealing
with expenses and interest relating to tax-exempt income) by which financial institu-
tions subject to state banking laws may deduct interest incurred on face amount certifi-
cates and paid on deposits towards their purchase, even though the institution invests
in tax-exempt securities, provided that its average investment in tax-exempts does not
exceed 15% of its total assets. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 265, as amended, Revenue
Act of 1964, § 216, 78 Stat. 56 (1964).
[Vol. 1964: 667
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1964
reason for denying an interest deduction in connection with a loan
to purchase life insurance, while allowing taxpayers to deduct in-
terest on other personal indebtedness. Why should the law be so
chary about allowing a deduction for interest on a loan incurred
to purchase life insurance, while it remains completely indifferent
to the deduction of interest on loans to meet other personal ex-
penses? The deduction of interest on personal loans should be
disallowed entirely, since it represents a deduction for personal
expenses which are normally nondeductible. Presumably the prin-
cipal impact of such a disallowance would be upon persons who are
buying a home and paying interest on a mortgage. Thus, the dis-
allowance would have the desirable effect of diminishing to some
extent the discrimination which the income tax permits in favor of
persons who own their own home and are not taxed upon the rental
value thereof vis- L-vis those who rent a home and are denied any
deduction for their rental payments.
The 1964 Act both broadens and contracts the deduction for
charitable contributions. Under prior law an individual was entitled
to deduct his charitable contributions up to 20 percent of his ad-
justed gross income, with an additional 10 percent allowance for
gifts to churches, schools, hospitals, medical research organizations,
and foundations set up to receive and disburse contributions to
colleges and universities owned and operated by state and local
governments. The 1964 Act extends the 30 percent allowance to
gifts made to practically all charities except private charitable foun-
dations. Thus, the additional allowance applies to gifts to govern-
mental units and charitable, cultural and religious organizations
that derive a substantial part of their support from a governmental
unit or through contributions from the general public.8
The new law also allows an individual to carry over excess char-
itable contributions in the 30 percent class for a period of five years.89
It is important to notice that the carryover is limited to contributions
that qualify for the 30 percent allowance. When such excess charita-
ble contributions are carried over they are taken into account, along
with any current contributions qualifying for the 30 percent allow-
ance, before considering any other charitable contributions. This
88 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b) (1) (A), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 209 (a), 78 Stat. 43 (1964).
8' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (b) (5), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 209 (c), 78
Stat. 45 (1964).
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means that contributions to private charitable foundations may be
wasted for tax purposes unless they are timed with discrimination.
For example, suppose that A has an adjusted gross income of $20,000.
In 1964 he gives $8,000 to his college and $2,000 to a private char-
itable foundation. In 1965 he contributes $4,000 to the college and
$2,000 to the foundation. In 1964 A will deduct $6,000 of the gift
to the college and carry over $2,000.90 In 1965 his deduction for
charitable contributions again will be limited to 30 percent of his
adjusted gross income, consisting of the $4,000 donated currently
to the college and the $2,000 carried over from the previous year's
gift to the college. Since the gifts to the private charitable founda-
tion cannot be deducted currently or carried over, they are wasted
entirely from a tax point of view.
The new law increases the carryover of excess corporate char-
itable contributions from two years to five years in line with the
new individual carryover provision.91 This is the only change made
in connection with the deduction of charitable gifts by a corpora-
tion.
Some new restrictions are imposed upon the deduction for char-
itable contributions by the 1964 Act. In the past donors wishing
to give property to charity without parting with the possession and
enjoyment of the property during their lives, have made an im-
mediate gift of the property to the charity and retained the right
to possess and enjoy the property for life. For example, a man who
had a valuable painting which he wished to give to an art museum
at his death, might have made a present gift of the painting to the
museum with the proviso that he be allowed to retain possession
of the painting during his life. From a tax standpoint the advantages
of making the gift in this form rather than leaving it to the museum
by will were twofold: (1) the value of the property would not be
included in the donor's estate at his death for purposes of the estate
tax, and (2) the donor was entitled to an income tax deduction for a
charitable gift of the remainder during his life. In its deliberations
concerning the 1964 Act the House Ways and Means Committee
decided that it was unfair for a taxpayer to get an income tax deduc-
tion for a gift of property to charity when he did not part with pos-
90There will be no carryover of the $2,000 gift to the foundation because gifts
subject to the 20% limitation do not qualify for the carryover.
9' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (b) (2), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 209 (d) (1),
78 Stat. 46 (1964).
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session of the property. Therefore, it was provided that where
tangible personal property was given to charity, the donor should not
get an income tax deduction until the termination of any interest
retained in favor of the donor or a related person (as defined in
section 267 (b)). The House added an exception to this rule, how-
ever, where the retained interest took the form of a non-transferable
life interest in favor of the donor, or, in the case of a joint gift by
husband and wife, a non-transferable life interest in favor of the
spouses. 92 The exception, for all practical purposes, nullified the
rule. Consequently, the final version of the act eliminated the ex-
ception 93 except in the case of gifts made before July 1, 1964.94 The
new law does not forbid an income tax deduction where a taxpayer
makes a gift of a future interest in tangible personal property to char-
ity. It merely provides that the deduction cannot be taken until any
intervening interest in favor of the donor or a related person
terminates. This means, however, that if the donor retains a life
estate in the donated property he will never get an income tax de-
duction, since his life interest will terminate only at his death.
In this connection it is important to notice, that although the
final version of the act is more drastic than the one which passed
the House, it is far from a Draconian measure in view of its limita-
tion to tangible personal property. A deduction may still be taken
for gifts of realty or intangible personal property to charity, even
though the donor retains an interest in the property in favor of him-
self or a related person.
Another new restriction on the deduction for charitable gifts
is designed to prevent abuse of the unlimited deduction allowance.
Under prior law an individual was allowed an unlimited char-
itable deduction if, in the taxable year and eight out the ten pre-
ceding years, his charitable contributions and income taxes ex-
ceeded 90 percent of his taxable income computed without taking
into consideration charitable contributions, personal exemptions
and net operating loss carryovers. Under the 1964 Act the only
charitable contributions which are taken into account in determin-
ing whether the taxpayer qualifies for the unlimited deduction are
those qualifying for the new 30 percent allowance and gifts to
02 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1963).
03 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (f), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 209 (e), 78
Stat. 47 (1964) (former § 170 (f) redesignated as § 170 (h)).
R1 evenue Act of 1964, § 209 (f) (3), 78 Stat. 47 (1964).
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certain private charitable foundations which are actively engaged
in furthering charitable objectives and do not engage in prohibited
transactions as set forth in the statute.95 Presumably the purpose
of this provision is to limit the unlimited charitable deduction to
the taxpayer who actually donates the bulk of his income to genuine
charitable undertakings rather than to a private foundation operated
for personal profit.
Most revenue acts have brought some minor adjustment in the
mathematical limitations on the deduction for medical expenses.
The 1964 Act is no exception. Under the new law the 1 percent limi-
tation on the deduction of expenses for drugs is waived in the case
of drugs purchased for the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent
parent, provided such person has attained age sixty-five by the end
of the taxable year.96 In other words the 1 percent limitation on
the deduction of expenses for drugs is waived in the same situations
where the 3 percent limitation on the deduction of medical ex-
penses is waived.97
The new law expands the deduction for child and dependent
care in several respects. 98 The maximum amount of the deduction
has been increased from $600 to $900 in cases where the taxpayer
has more than one dependent for whom he furnishes care. More-
over, the age limit of a child qualifying the taxpayer for the deduc-
tion has been raised from eleven to twelve years. Under prior law a
working wife who claimed a deduction for child or dependent care
was required to file a joint return with her husband (unless he
was incapacitated and incapable of self support) and reduce the
amount of the deduction to the extent that the aggregate adjusted
gross income shown on the return exceeded $4,500. Under the 1964
Act only the excess of the aggregate adjusted gross income above
$6,000 reduces the deduction. Under prior law a man could claim
the deduction for child or dependent care only in the event that he
was a widower or was divorced or legally separated from his wife.
The 1964 Act permits a married man to claim the deduction if
his wife is incapacitated or institutionalized for a period of ninety
Or INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (g), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 209 (b), 78
Stat. 43 (1964).
90 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (b), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 211, 78
Stat. 49 (1964).
97 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (a).
08 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 212, 78 Stat. 49
(1964).
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consecutive days or until her death. Unless the wife is institutional-
ized for the requisite period, however, the married man who claims
a deduction for child or dependent care must file a joint return
and reduce the deduction to the extent that the aggregate adjusted
gross income shown on the return exceeds $6,000. Perhaps the
most interesting thing about the deduction for child and dependent
care is how complicated a trivial deduction such as this can become.
One cannot help wondering whether the deduction, the merits of
which are debatable at best, justifies the efforts which must go into
claiming and policing it.
In 1962 Congress, as part of the crusade against expense-account
living, added a new section to the Code which provided that when
a taxpayer made a combined business and pleasure trip, his travel
expenses to and from his business destination had to be reduced by
the proportion of the time devoted to pleasure. This requirement
was waived in the event that the total time away from home was
not in excess of one week, or if less than 25 percent of the total
time away from home was devoted to pleasure. The 1964 Act
repeals this provision retroactively except in the case of trips
abroad.90 This may conceivably herald the beginning of a general
retreat from the travel and entertainment expense reforms of 1962.
One change made by the 1964 Act in connection with deductions
relates to the proper time for deducting an item, rather than to the
propriety of the deduction itself. In United States v. Consolidated
Edison Co.100 the Supreme Court held that a contested tax could
not be accrued and deducted even though the taxpayer paid the tax.
The deduction could not be taken until the contest over the tax
was settled and the liability had become fixed and certain. Congress
has now repudiated the Court's decision, and the new law provides
that contested liabilities may be accrued and deducted when pay-
ment is made.10 1 If the taxpayer later receives a refund he will
simply include the amount of the refund in his gross income in the
0" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274 (c), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 217, 78 Stat.
56 (1964).
100 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
2 01 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 461 (f), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 223 (a) (1), 78
Stat. 76 (1964); INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 43, as amended, Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 223 (a)(2), 78 Stat. 76 (1964). The new provision applies generally to contested
liabilities; it is not limited to taxes. It does not apply, however, to the deduction for
income, war profits and excess profits taxes imposed by a foreign country or possession
of the United States.
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year of recovery. Perhaps the principal significance of the new
provision for accruing and deducting contested liabilities lies in the
insight it offers into the futility of our present procedure for
settling tax cases. Without a Court of Tax Appeals it is impossible
to conclusively settle the construction of a federal tax statute short
of the Supreme Court. When a tax case finally gets to the Supreme
Court (and a decreasing number do) the law has usually been
changed, or, as was true with regard to the holding in the Consoli-
dated Edison case, will be changed as soon as the case is decided.
10 2
It would be far more sensible to create a Court of Tax Appeals to
settle tax questions simply and expeditiously. This would relieve
the Supreme Court of the burden of these problems and prevent
their being left up in the air until Congress or the Supreme Court
chooses to take action on them.
CREDITS
One of the criticisms leveled at the investment credit upon its
adoption in 1962, was that it required the taxpayer to reduce the
basis of the property in connection with which the credit was claimed
by the amount of the credit. This, of course, reduced his basis for
depreciation and deprived him of part of the benefit of the credit.
The 1964 Act takes heed of this criticism by providing that the
basis of property shall no longer be reduced by the amount of the
investment credit.10 3 Moreover, where the basis of property was
reduced under the 1962 provision, the reduction will now be re-
stored for purposes of computing future depreciation and gain or
loss.104 A similar provision was adopted in connection with leased
property where the lessee is permitted to claim the credit. Under
the 1962 Act the lessee's deductions for rent had to be reduced
by the amount of the credit taken. This is no longer required 05
In addition, a lessee whose deductions for rent were reduced under
prior law is permitted to recoup this reduction by amortizing and
deducting it over the remaining useful life of the property.100 A
1o2 See Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, I Sup. CT. REV. 222
(1960).
03 Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (a) (1), 78 Stat. 33 (1964); Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 203 (a) (4), 78 Stat. 34 (1964).
104 Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (a) (2) (A), 78 Stat. 33 (1964).
105 Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (a) (1), 78 Stat. 33 (1964); Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 203 (a) (4), 78 Stat. 34 (1964).
106 Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (a) (2) (B), 78 Stat. 33 (1964).
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further change made by the 1964 Act in connection with lessees
claiming the investment credit is that the credit shall now be com-
puted on the basis of the fair market value of the property, regard-
less of whether it was constructed or purchased by the lessor, except
where the lessor and lessee are affiliated corporations. In the latter
case the credit is still based upon cost. 07
The elimination of the basis reduction requirement in connec-
tion with the investment credit entails certain collateral conse-
quences which are taken into account by the new law. Since the
basis of property will no longer be reduced because of the credit,
it will not be increased when the property is disposed of prematurely
and the investment credit is required to be recaptured and ac-
counted for. Nor will a deduction be allowed for any part of the
investment credit which cannot be used when the period for carry-
ing over the credit expires. 08 Such a deduction was provided under
prior law to compensate for the reduction in basis which no longer
occurs.
With some variations the same property that qualifies for the
investment credit is subject to section 1245. That provision requires
gain from the disposition of depreciable property to be treated as
ordinary income to the extent that it represents depreciation de-
ducted after 1961. Since the 1964 Act qualifies elevators and es-
calators for the investment credit, 0 9 it also subjects such property
to the provisions of section 1245.110 As we have seen, one unhappy
result of including elevators and escalators under section 1245 is
that when a building is sold the gain from the building will be
governed by section 1250, while the gain from any elevators or es-
calators in the building will fall under section 1245."'
The credit for retirement income is another of the income tax
provisions which is remarkably complicated, considering its trivial
character and the fact that it is of principal concern to the low-
bracket taxpayer who can hardly be expected to have a tax expert
at his elbow. A further complication has been added by the 1964
107 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 48 (d), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (b), 78
Stat. 34 (1964).
1o Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (a) (3) (B), 78 Stat. 34 (1964).
1o0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 48 (a) (1) (C), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 203 (c),
78 Stat. 34 (1964).
110 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1245 (a) (3) (C), added by Revenue Act of 1964,
§ 203 (d), 78 Stat. 35 (1964).
"I See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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Act. Under prior law the maximum amount of retirement income
that qualified for the credit was $1,524. Qualified spouses could each
claim the maximum credit on a joint return, although the credits
for each spouse had to be computed separately. The 1964 Act
permits a maximum of $2,286 to be treated as retirement income by
spouses sixty-five years of age or over on a joint return, even though
only one of the spouses qualifies for the retirement credit." 2 This pro-
vision reflects an effort to conform the retirement income credit
to the exemption for social security payments which includes sup-
plementary benefits to the extent of one-half of the husband's bene-
fits for a wife who has not met covered employment requirements.
The new ceiling means, of course, that where both spouses meet the
requirements for the retirement income credit, taxpayers must now
compute the credit in two ways in order to insure receipt of the maxi-
mum benefit.
The amount of the retirement income credit is limited to a
percentage of the income eligible for the credit approximating the
tax in the lowest bracket. Under prior law this was 20 percent.
Under the 1964 Act it will be 17 percent in 1964 and 15 percent
in 1965.113 This raises an interesting point. The justification for
the tortuous details of the retirement income credit is that the
credit is intended to equalize the tax of a person who is not entitled
to social security with that of the taxpayer who receives such pay-
ments. For this reason retirement income, in order to qualify for
the credit, is required to conform to the requirements that a person
must meet in order to be eligible for social security; retirement
income is reduced by earned income to the same extent that social
security payments are reduced by earned income, and so on.
Strangely enough, however, social security payments are exempt
from the income tax, while retirement income is limited to only a
modest credit. Suppose, for example, that there are two taxpayers,
both of whom are in the 70 percent bracket. One receives $1,000 in
social security payments, while the other receives $1,000 in retire-
ment income qualifying for the retirement income credit. The first
taxpayer will escape an income tax of $700 because of the exemption
112 INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 37 (i), added by Revenue Act of 1964, § 202 (a), 78
Stat. 33 (1964) (former § 37 (i) redesignated as § 37 (j)).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 37 (a), as amended, Revenue Act of 1964, § 113 (a), 78
Stat. 24 (1964).
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for social security payments. The other taxpayer will get a credit
(in 1965) of only $150 against his tax.
The strangest thing of all about the retirement income credit,
however, is that Congress ever adopted this form of tax relief.
Since there is no reason for exempting social security payments from
the income tax (and it is pretty generally conceded that such pay-
ments should be taxed), the obvious way to eliminate any dis-
crimination between retired taxpayers who receive social security
and those receiving some other form of retirement income would be
to tax social security payments as income. Unhappily, however,
the credit for retirement income is a fairly typical example of how
tax law is apt to be made. The law first creates an unjustified pref-
erence. Congress then strives to remedy the injustice created by
the preference, not by abolishing the preference, but by extending
it to other taxpayers similarly situated. This has been the case, for
example, in connection with percentage depletion. Percentage de-
pletion was initially conceived for the oil and gas industry. In-
stead of repealing the allowance when its unfairness became obvious,
Congress extended it to other depletable properties except timber,
which has its own special preferences. Two wrongs may not make
a right. Nevertheless, a great deal of tax legislation is predicated
upon the assumption that they do. 114
111 Several other provisions of the 1964 Act which are not referred to in the text are:
Revenue Act of 1964, § 219, 78 Stat. 57 (1964) providing that certain union negoti-
ated multi-employer pension plans may be treated as qualified from the date they
were created.
Revenue Act of 1964, § 220, 78 Stat. 58 (1964) permitting domestic corporations
to include in their pension or profit-sharing plans employees of foreign subsidiaries or
domestic subsidiaries largely engaged in foreign operations, who are citizens of the
United States.
Revenue Act of 1964, § 222, 78 Stat. 75 (1964) permitting gains from retail sales
under a revolving credit plan to be reported as installment sales, except where the
revolving credit plan is used by a purchaser primarily as an ordinary charge account.
Revenue Act of 1964, § 228, 78 Stat. 98 (1964) making several amendments in con-
nection with the taxation of insurance companies.
Revenue Act of 1964, § 286, 78 Stat. 127 (1964) providing that federal tax liens
shall not run against a purchaser of a motor vehicle without notice of the lien.
Revenue Act of 1964, § 239, 78 Stat. 128 (1964) extending the time for claiming
credits and refunds for overpaid self-employment taxes by state or local employees
arising from an agreement with the state or local government extending social security
coverage to the employees and imposing taxes retroactively on their wages.
Revenue Act of 1964, § 240, 78 Stat. 129 (1964) extending the time for payment
of the federal estate tax on a reversionary interest to three years after termination of
the prior interest.
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